# Amazon — Fine-grained access control for Amazon Bedrock Managed Knowledge Base tools

- Company: Amazon (amazon.com)
- Announced: 2026-11-12T15:40:24+00:00
- Category: not stated
- Coverage: not counted
- Announcement: no
- Group: routine
- Source: https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/machine-learning/fine-grained-access-control-for-amazon-bedrock-managed-knowledge-base-tools/
- Record: https://forck.live/items/35326-fine-grained-access-control-for-amazon-bedrock-managed-knowledge-base-tools
- Subject: Bedrock / Nova

Amazon's guide shows how to keep an agent's document searches scoped to the signed-in user when a shared knowledge base serves many employees or tenants. The problem is that an LLM picks the tool arguments at runtime, so a search tool that takes "who to search as" lets a prompt injection or model error make the agent search as someone else. The design puts verified identity in trusted code instead: a request interceptor on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Gateway resolves the email from the validated JWT and overwrites the userContext argument of tools/call. A Cedar policy in AgentCore then denies the request if userContext.userId does not match the token's email claim, and the knowledge base's resource-based policy denies searches from principals other than the gateway's execution role. Managed Knowledge Base's ACL awareness returns only chunks the userContext user may view, though the post says it filters results and "isn't an authorization mechanism by itself". The sample stores department A and B business plans plus a shared notice in one knowledge base, with two users searching through the same agent.

## Evidence

Verbatim from https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/machine-learning/fine-grained-access-control-for-amazon-bedrock-managed-knowledge-base-tools/:

> More enterprises are building AI agents into their daily work, and a common pattern is an agent that searches internal documents to compose its answers. A single organization might soon run hundreds of agents, each connected to many data sources and tools. This raises a question. When an agent searches on behalf of a user, can you make sure that it uses only the information that user is allowed to see?
> 
> Consider AnyCompany, a fictional company that builds an internal assistant shared by all employees. An employee in department A asks, “Compare my department’s business plan with the notice to all departments, and list the initiatives that are behind schedule.” The agent writes its own search queries and keeps searching internal documents until it has enough information. Employees in department B ask the same assistant the same question. If the application doesn’t scope searches to each user, the department B business plan can end up in an answer to an employee in department A. If you replace the departments with customer companies, the same problem occurs in a multi-tenant software as a service (SaaS) architecture where multiple customers share one assistant and knowledge base.

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Record: https://forck.live/items/35326-fine-grained-access-control-for-amazon-bedrock-managed-knowledge-base-tools
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